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BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is in the Court of Appeals based upon Utah
Code Ann. Sec. 78-2A-3(2)(a) (1992).

ISSUES PRESENTED
A.

Does the failure of an administrative agency to

hold an informal adjudicative proceeding as required by
statute deny a Petitioner's right to due process, and does
it obviate the need for a trial de novo?
B.

If the district court is required to conduct a

trial de novo, is such review Mon the record/' and therefore
subject to the "residuum rule"?

1

C.

Is legally incompetent evidence rendered competent

(for purposes of the residuum rule) by a Petitioner's
failure to object to its admissibility, where no one appears
on behalf of the State to offer such into evidence, and
where no foundation for its introduction has been laid?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
A copy of the determinative statute, Utah Code Ann,
Sec. 63-46b-15 (Supp. 1992) is attached as Addendum E.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from the final judgment and decree of
the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, The Honorable
J. Dennis Frederick presiding.
Appellee Judy A. Cordova's driver's license was
suspended for a period of ninety days following a proceeding
before the Department of Public Safety, Drivers License
Division (the "Department"), at which neither the appellee,
the arresting officer, nor anyone else appeared.
Upon petition to the district court, Cordova's motion
to vacate and set aside the administrative order suspending
her license was granted.

Final judgment was entered on May

15, 1992, and the Notice of Appeal was filed June 5, 1992.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellee does not dispute the Statement of Facts in the
"Brief of the Appellant" (at pages 4-6), and herein
incorporates the statement of facts by reference.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Utah Code Ann- Sec 41-2-130(6)(a) (Supp. 1992) requires
the Department to hold an administrative hearing at the
request of an individual arrested for driving under the
influence of drugs and/or alcohol, prior to the suspension
of his or her driver's license*

The failure of the

Department to hold the hearing as Cordova requested, was a
denial of her right to due process*

Therefore, the district

court's decision to vacate and set aside the administrative
order should be upheld.
POINT II
Judicial review of the Department's informal
adjudicative proceedings is by "on the record" trial de
novo.

Accordingly, the district court is entitled to set

aside the action of the agency where there is not "a modicum
of legally competent evidence" to satisfy the requirements
of the "residuum rule."

ARGUMENT
I.
DEPARTMENT'S FAILURE TO CONDUCT A HEARING DENIED
CORDOVA'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS, AND WAS ADEQUATE GROUNDS FOR
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER VACATING AND SETTING ASIDE THE
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER OF THE DEPARTMENT.

3

A. UTAH CODE ANN. SEC, 41-2-130 REQUIRES THAT A
HEARING BE HELD, IF REQUESTED, PRIOR TO THE SUSPENSION
OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S DRIVER'S LICENSE.
Cordova was not provided with the administrative
hearing which she reguested pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec.
41-2-130 (6) (a) (Supp. 1992).

The statute entitles a person

arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI),
upon reguest, to an administrative hearing before the
Department, prior to the suspension of his or her license.
(The statute is attached as Addendum A.)

The purpose of the

statute is undoubtedly to ensure that an individual's right
to operate a motor vehicle is not denied without adeguate
due process protection.
Although a time was set for the hearing, neither
Cordova, her attorney, the arresting officer, the operator
of the breathilyzer, nor anyone else appeared before the
Department.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

("Findings") at 2; Record ("R") at 45, attached as Addendum
B.)

The hearing officer simply reviewed the information

contained in the Department's file, and made a determination
that there was a preponderance of evidence to support the
suspension of Cordova's license.

Department Of Public

Safety, Driver License Division, Findings of Proceedings on
Hearings for Administrative Suspension at 4; R. at 42
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, "Transcript").
The action taken by the Department did not provide the
"hearing" guaranteed under Utah Code Ann. Sec. 41-2-130.

4

The term "hearing" implies that at least one party be heard.
A hearing is a:
Proceeding of relative formality (though generally less
formal then a trial), generally public, with definite
issues of fact or of law to be tried, in which
witnesses are heard and parties proceeded against have
right to be heard, and is much the same as a trial and
may terminate a final order.
Black's Law Dictionary 367 (5th Edition).

If no parties are

present, no testimony can be taken, no foundation for
competent evidence laid, and generally insufficient grounds
on which the hearing officer can base a decision.

Had the

arresting officer appeared, the Department could have
conducted a "hearing."

However, the failure of both parties

to appear precluded the Department from holding any kind of
meaningful hearing to which Cordova was entitled, even in
her absence.
The Commission as an administrative body may be
justified in taking the position that it is not
necessarily bound to adhere to the technical rules of
evidence and procedure as applied in the courts.
Nevertheless, wherein it is performing a duty of a
judicial nature in which the findings of facts and the
adjudication of important rights is involved, care
should be taken that the procedures should comport with
standards of fairness and due process.
Club Stanyon Street v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 615
P.2d 435, 436 (Utah 1980).
The statute controlling the Department's DUI "refusal"
hearings lends support to the contention that the Department

5

did not hold a "per se" hearing as required,1

Kith

"refusal" cases, the Department may suspend a driver's
license automatically upon a failure of the Petitioner to
appear on the date set for the hearing.
(c) If a hearing is requested by the person and
conducted by the division, and the division determines
that the person was requested to submit to a chemical
test or tests and refused to submit to the test or
tests, or if the person fails to appear before the
division as required in the notice, the division shall
revoke his license or permit.. ..
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 41-6-44.10 (2) (f) (Supp. 1992) (emphasis
added).
statute.

No such provision is contained in the "per se"
Were it the intent of the Legislature to permit

the Department to default the Petitioner and forego
administrative hearings where the "per se" Petitioner fails
to appear, it would have so indicated by including similar
language in the "per se" statute.
The District Court recognized that "a hearing and
findings supported by a modicum of competent legal evidence
is an appropriate and necessary safeguard to protect
Petitioner and persons similarly situated from having their
driving privilege taken from them without due process of
law." (R. at 46.)

Having determined that Cordova was not

accorded the due process rights to which she was

1 "Refusal" hearings pertain to situations where the
Petitioner fails to submit to chemical tests as required,
and are governed by Utah Code Ann. Sec. 41-6-44.10 (Supp.
1992).
(Attached as Addendum C.) "Per se" hearings are
held subject to the requirements of Sec. 41-2-130 in
situations where the petitioner does submit to the required
chemical tests.

6

entitled, the court correctly vacated and set aside the
administrative action.

This comports with the scheme of the

"per se" statute, Utah Code Ann. Sec. 41-2-130, in its
recognition that the division has no authority to suspend
except after a "hearing."

"(g) After the hearing, the

division shall order whether the person's license to operate
a motor vehicle be suspended or not."

Utah Code Ann. Sec.

41-2-130(6)(g).
B. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT'S INFORMAL
ADJUDICATORY PROCEEDINGS BY TRIAL DE NOVO DOES NOT
RELIEVE THE DEPARTMENT OF ITS OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE
CORDOVA WITH AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING.
Appellant believes that Cordova's statutory right to a
trial de novo before the district court relieves the
Department of its obligation to conduct a hearing.

That

notion, however, is contrary to the administrative hearing
concept, and compromises the entire administrative process.
The purpose of judicial review of administrative
decision making is to ensure that agency determinations are
not made arbitrarily, and that minimum due process standards
are maintained.
(1962)•

2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law Sec. 555

When an agency fails to hold a hearing as required

by statute, that agency has clearly failed to meet that
minimum standard.

Although a trial de novo review of an

administrative hearing provides the Petitioner with an
additional opportunity to present his or her case, it in no
manner relieves the administrative agency of its obligation
to conduct a hearing.

7

One purpose of the administrative hearing is to allow
those with experience in a particular field to make a
decision based on their specialized knowledge*

That purpose

is contravened when an agency can avoid responsibility by
relying on the reviewing court to make decisions on its
behalf.

Judicial review should provide a "check" on the

administrative system, not take the place of the system.
Accordingly, the availability of judicial review by trial de
novo cannot cure the procedural defect of the complete lack
of a hearing at the administrative level.

To hold that a

trial de novo under such circumstances would satisfy the
Petitioner's right to due process, would undermine the
administrative process, and render informal adjudicatory
proceedings superfluous.

The district court has some

responsibility to vouchsafe this notion, otherwise Utah Code
Ann. Sec. 63-46b-17, attached as Addendum D, is meaningless.
This statute clearly provides that in granting relief in
either a formal or informal setting, it may, inter alia, set
aside or modify agency action or otherwise order other
agency action, including further agency proceedings.
C.
THE DISTRICT COURT IS NOT REQUIRED TO HOLD A TRIAL
DE NOVO WHERE ADEQUATE GROUNDS EXIST TO SET ASIDE THE
DEPARTMENT'S ORDER WITHOUT THE NEED FOR A COMPLETE
TRIAL.
Had the Department accorded Cordova the hearing to
which she was entitled, the district court could have
proceeded with a review by trial de novo.

However, the lack

of an administrative hearing precluded a trial de novo as
there was no informal adjudicatory proceeding for the court
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to review.

This is particularly relevant where, as here,

judicial review is by trial de novo "on the record."2
In University of Utah v. Industrial Commission, 736
P.2d 630 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court had an
opportunity to comment on the adequacy of a trial de novo
review of a decision of the Industrial Commission.

The

court ruled that in the context of an appeal of an
antidiscrimination case, the district court could affirm the
findings of the Industrial Commission, or make its own
findings.

The reviewing court "was not bound by the record,

but may supplement the record, create an entirely new
record, or elect to do a combination of these."

Id. at 634.

See also, Salt Lake City Corp. v. Confer, 674 P.2d 632 (Utah
1983) .
The same rationale supports the district court's
decision in regard to Cordova.

The court reviewed the

record, and made an independent determination that the
procedures accorded Cordova and the evidence presented at
the administrative hearing were insufficient to justify the
suspension of her license.

Accordingly, the court vacated

and set aside the administrative order.

The decision

comports with the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA)3
statement that in granting relief from an agency

2 The implications of "on the record" trial de novo are
discussed in greater detail in "Point II", infra.
3 Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-46-1 to -22 (1989).
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adjudicatory proceeding, the district court may "set aside
or modify agency action."

Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-46b-

17(b)(iv) (1989).
Having decided thusly, it would have been a waste of
judicial resources to hold a trial de novo where facts
existed which enabled the district court to reach its
conclusion that the agency action was improper.

As stated

in University of Utah v. Industrial Commission:
A trial judge is accorded broad discretion in
determining how a trial shall proceed in his or her
courtroom. If a trial can be held with expedience,
i.e., if the days required for trial can be minimized
without any compromise of the rights of the parties,
certainly this is beneficial to the interests of
judicial economy and resolution of disputes. The
district court's procedure here, although falling
somewhere between a new trial and a review of the
record, was proper.
Id, at 633.

As the above passage indicates, the district

court is not required to hold a complete judicial review by
trial de novo where it can reach a decision based on the
information at its disposal.
II• ASSUMING THAT THE DISTRICT COURT IS REQUIRED TO CONDUCT
JUDICIAL REVIEW BY TRIAL DE NOVO, THE DECISION TO VACATE AND
SET ASIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER SHOULD STILL BE UPHELD.
A. TRIAL DE NOVO REVIEW OF DEPARTMENT'S "PER SE"
LICENSE SUSPENSION HEARINGS IS "ON THE RECORD."
All Department of Public Safety hearings are, by
designation, informal adjudicative proceedings. Utah Admin.
R. 708-17-6 (1992).

Therefore, judicial review of the

Department's hearings is governed by the UAPA as follows:
"The district courts shall have jurisdiction to review by
trial de novo all final agency actions resulting from

10

informal adjudicative proceedings,

Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-

46b-15(l)(a) (Supp. 1992).
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the term "trial
de novo" has two different meanings: "(1) A complete retrial
upon new evidence; (2) a trial upon the record made before
the lower tribunal."

Denver & R.G.W.R. Co. v. Public

Service Commission, 98 Utah 431, 436, 100 P.2d 552, 554
(1940) .

The form of trial de novo which is used in a

particular instance is "dictated by the wording and context
of the statute in which it appears and by the nature of the
administrative body, decision and procedure being reviewed."
Pledger v. Cox, 626 P.2d 415, 416-17 (Utah 1981).
The Pledger test, as applied to "per se" drivers
license suspension hearings, makes it clear that judicial
review of such actions is "on the record" within the second
meaning of "trial de novo."
In Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., the Court placed particular
emphasis on the wording of the statute at issue which
provided for "plenary review" in the district court as a
trial de novo.

98 Utah at 436, 100 P.2d at 554.

The Utah

Supreme Court interpreted that statute as requiring a trial
de novo "on the record."
To review an action is to study or examine it again.
Thus, "trial de novo" as used here must have a meaning
consistent with the continued existence of that which
is to be again examined or studied. If in these cases,
the first meaning were applied to the use of the term
"trial de novo" then one could not consistently speak
of it as a review, as the Commission's action would no
longer exist to be re-examined or re-studied.
Id. at 436, 100 P.2d at 555.
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The wording and context of the UAPA supports a similar
conclusion.

As noted, the UAPA requires the district court

to "review by trial de novo" all license suspension
hearings.

As in Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., the term "review"

presupposes the continued existence of the Department's
action, and therefore review should be "on the record."
On the record review of "per se" license suspension
hearings also accords with the second prong of the Pledger
test concerning "the nature of the administrative body, the
decision and procedure being reviewed."

Although Pledger

held that, in the context of driver's license suspension
hearings the term trial de novo should be "a complete
retrial upon new evidence" as opposed to "on the record,"
that language is inapposite here inasmuch as Pledger
involved a "refusal" hearing (as opposed to a "per se"
hearing) decided prior to the enactment of the UAPA.

626

P.2d 415
Appellant incorrectly cites Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman,
790 P.2d 587 (Utah App. 1990), as support for its argument
that trial de novo in Cordova's situation is within the
first Pledger definition.

Brinkerhoff held that the

Petitioner "was able to present his entire case before a new
tribunal for an independent decision."

Id, at 590.

This

reasoning, however, is more consistent with "on the record"
trial de novo.

Under either definition, the court has the

discretion to hear new evidence from the parties.

The

primary distinction between the two forms of trial de novo
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is that in an uon

the record" review, the court may use the

administrative record to assist in its determination.
The Administrative Regulations of the Department are
consistent with an "on the record" trial de novo.
Record. The presiding officer may choose to make a
verbatim recording or record the testimony, information
and documents on forms provided by the division with
"quotations of the verbatim testimony" sufficient for
court review.
Utah Admin.R. 708-17-8(8) (1992).

Furthermore, the

presiding officer is required to make a brief written
summary of the hearing containing material facts, his or her
recommendation for agency action, findings of fact and
conclusions, and reasons for the recommendation, "in any
form calculated to facilitate the proceeding and review."
Utah Admin.R. 708-17-9(6) (1992).

The fact that both of the

cited regulations anticipate that the administrative record
will be utilized on review, is evidence that the second
prong of the Pledger test—the nature of the administrative
body, decision and procedure being reviewed—also indicates
that trial de novo review of the Department's informal
adjudicatory proceedings should be "on the record."
Again a review of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-46b-17
(Addendum D) is enlightening, as it demonstrates the broad
discretion which the district court has to fashion a remedy.
This would not be so if the district court were left with
absolutely no vestige of authority to inquire into agency
proceedings and take action based solely thereon when
appropriate and necessary.
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B. SINCE DISTRICT COURT REVIEW OF "PER SE" LICENSE
SUSPENSION HEARINGS IS "ON THE RECORD/' THE "RESIDUUM
RULE" IS APPLICABLE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW,
As discussed, trial de novo review of the Department's
informal adjudicatory proceedings is "on the record".
Accordingly, the district court may determine whether a
modicum of legal evidence existed at the administrative
hearing to satisfy the "residuum rule."
The residuum rule holds that, "Although administrative
agencies may rely upon hearsay evidence, a residuum of
competent legal evidence must support the agencies'
findings."

Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah

App. 1987).

The agencies' findings, however, "cannot be

based exclusively on hearsay evidence."

Yacht Club v. Utah

Liquor Control Comm'n, 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 1984).
While hearsay evidence may become legally competent, it
first must be properly admitted.

Industrial Power v.

Industrial Commission, 187 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 31 (Utah
1992).

Such was not the case here.

Similar to Kehl, Cordova's arresting officer did not
testify, nor did anyone else.

Accordingly, all of the

evidence considered by the hearing officer was inadmissible
hearsay.

While the evidence might have been admissible had

a proper foundation been laid, the absence of any testimony
to that effect rendered all of the evidence inherently
unreliable.
In Kehl, the lack of foundational testimony as to
whether the arresting officer's DUI report was prepared in

14

the regular course of business contemporaneously with the
arrest of Kehl, led the appellate court to rule that the
report could not be admitted as a business record exception
to the hearsay rule803(6))-

735 P.2d at 417 (citing Utah R.Evid.

Similarly, the absence of testimony as to the

qualifications of the officer to administer the chemical
test rendered the results of that test inadmissible under
the public records exception.

Id. (citing Utah R.Evid.

803(8) (B)) .
As in Kehl, the fact that a proper foundation was not
ascertained in regard to the evidence considered by
Cordova's hearing officer, rendered the evidence inherently
unreliable.

Therefore, there was not "a residuum of

competent legal evidence to support the agency's finding,"
(Findings at 3; R. at 46.), and the district court's ruling
to that effect should be upheld.
C. CORDOVA'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE
AT THE DEPARTMENT "HEARING" DOES NOT RENDER THE
EVIDENCE LEGALLY COMPETENT AND SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY
THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE RESIDUUM RULE.
Appellant argues that Cordova's failure to object to
the evidence at the administrative proceeding rendered the
evidence legally competent for purposes of the "residuum
rule."

That argument is without merit.

is not a rule of evidence.

The "residuum rule"

It is a substantive legal

requirement, which goes to the heart of the basis for the
administrative order.

To permit the Department to suspend

Cordova's driver's license based on such evidence would be
to allow form to triumph over substance.

15

The import of the

residuum rule is more fundamental than the mere question of
waiver of otherwise incompetent evidence.
The district court concluded that, "[Appellant's]
argument is not compelling.

Though it may have been had the

arresting officer or other witnesses for the State appeared
and testified." (Findings at 3; R. at 46.)

Had such

witnesses appeared, testimony could have been elicited as to
the foundation for the evidence, and if satisfactory, the
evidence could properly be admitted.

Absent such testimony,

the evidence is inherently unreliable, and therefore not
legally competent regardless of whether or not Cordova
objects.

Kehl, 735 P.2d at 417.
CONCLUSION

The failure of the Department to hold an administrative
hearing denied Cordova her right to due process prior to the
suspension of her driver's license.

The district court was

correct in holding that Cordova was prejudiced thereby, and
its judgment vacating and setting aside the administrative
order should be affirmed.
If this court determines that the district court should
have held a trial de novo, then judicial review is "on the
record," and the "residuum rule" is applicable. Accordingly,
the absence of a modicum of legally competent evidence
provides sufficient grounds for the reversal of the
administrative order.

As neither side was prejudiced by the

district court's failure to conduct a trial de novo, the
judgment below should be affirmed.

16

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of October, 1992,

Herschel Bullen
Attorney for PlaintiffAppellee
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ADDENDUM A
UTAH CODE ANN. SEC. 41-2-130 (Supp. 1992)

41-2-130

MOTOR VEPHCLES

the name of the chapter reference m Suhsection (12)(a)
The 1991 amendment b\ ch 190, effectne
October 1 1991 inserted '-u pension or' m
Subsection (lXa), subdivided Subsection (otfa1,

changed the st\ le of the chapter references
throughout, and made o n e r st\hsuc changes
This section is set out a* re^oncil^d bv the
Office of Legislative R search and General
Counbel

41-2-130. Chemical test for driving under the influence —
Temporary li ense — Hearing and decision —
Suspension and fee — Judicial review.
(1) (a) When a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person
may be violating or has violated Sec ion 4 -6-44, the peace officer may, in
connection with arresting the person, request that the person submit to a
chemical test or tests to be administered m compliance with the standards under Section 41-6-44.10.
(b) In this section, a reference to Section 41-6-44 includes any similar
local oidmance adopted m compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1)
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the person s submission
to a chemical test that a test result indicating a violation of Section 41-6-44
shall, and the existence of a blood alcohol content sufficient to render the
person incapable of safely driving a vehicle may, result m suspension or revocation of the person's iicense to operate a motor vehicle
(3) If the person submits to a chemical test and the test results indicate a
blood or breath alcohol content m violation of Section 41-6-44, or if the officer
makes a determination, based on reasonable grounds, that the person is otherwise m violation of Section 41-6-44, the officer directing administration of the
test or makm j the determination shall serve on the per jn, on behalf of the
division, immediate notice of the division's intention to suspend the person's
license to operate a vehicle
(4) (a) When the officer serves immediate notice on behalf of the division
he shall(l) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator;
(u) issue a temporary license certificate effective for only 29 days,
and
(in) supply to the operator, on a form to be approved by th* division, basic information regarding how to < otam a prompt h .ring
before the division
(b) A citation issued by the officer may, if approved as to form by the
division, ser\e also as the temporary license certificate
(5) The peace officer serving the notice shall send to the division w ithm five
days after the date of arrest and service of the notice.
(H) the person s license certificate,
(b) a copy of the citation issued for the offense;
(c) a signed icport on a form approved Ly the division indicating the
chemical test results, if any, and
(d) any other basis fur the officer's determination that th \ D ^ O I has
violated Section 4tl-b-44
(6) (a) Upon written *eq ^ t , the division c hall grant > clio { erson t n o^
portunity to be he aid swihm ?9 da^s oilu. the dj»te oi ^ o5i fhe i ctu ^
shall lo made ^ ithm len cl lys of the cL-J „ of the t u c t
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(b) A hearing, if held, shall bo before the division in the county in
which the arrest occurred, unless the division and the person agree that
the hearing n a y be held in some other county.
(c) The he ring shall be documented and shall cover the issues of:
(i) v/h her a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe the
person v ; operating a motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44;
(ii) hither the person refused to submit to the test; and
(iii) the test results, if any.
(d) In connection with a he' :ing the division or its authorized agent
may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas r the attendance of
witnesses and the production of relevant books a,id papers.
(e) One or more members of the division may conduct the hearing.
(0 Any decision made after a hearing before any number of the members of the division is as valid as if made after a hearing before the full
membership of the division.
(g) A lev the hearing, the division shall order whether the person's
license to operate a motor vehicle be suspended or not.
(7) (a) A first suspension, whether ordered or not challenged under this
subsection, is for a period of 90 days, beginning on the 30th day after the
^date of the arrest.
(b) A s jcond or subsequent suspension under this subsection is for a
period of one year, beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest.
(8) (a) The division shall assess against a person, in addition to any fee
imposed under Subsection 41-2-112(15), a fee under Section 41-2-103,
which shall be paid before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to
cover administrative costs. This fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed division hearing or court decision that the suspension was not proper.
(b) A person whose license has been suspended by the division under
this subsection may file a petition within 30 days after the suspension for
a hearing on the matter which, if held, is governed by Section 41-2-131.
History: C. 1953, 41-2-19.6, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 99, § 6; 1987, eh. 129, § 2; renumbered bv L. 1987, ch. 137, § 30; 1990, ch. 30,
§ 6; 1992, ch. 21, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, redesignated
the former second and third sentences of Subsection (3) as present Subsection (4), former
Subsection (4) as present Subsections (5Xa) to
(5Xd), former Subsection (5) as present Subsection (6), the second sentence in former Subsection (5)(b) as present Subsections (6Xc)(i) to
(GXcXiii), the former third and fourth sentences of former Subsection (5Xb) as present
Subsections (6Xd) and (6)(e), former Subsection
(5Xc) as present Subsections (6)(f) and (6)(g\
and former Subsections (5Xd) and (5)(e) as

present Subsections (7), (8Xa), and (8)(b); substituted "Subsection 41-2-112(14)" for "Subsection 41-2-112(6)" in the first sentence in
present Subsection (8)(a); and made stylistic
changes.
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,
1992, in Subsection (4) added the (a) and (b)
designations, redesignating former Subsections i4)(a) to (c) as Subsections (4)(a)(i) to (iii);
in Subsections (4)(a)(ii) and (6Xa) substituted
"29 days" for "30 days"; subdivided Subsection
(7), substituted "30th day" for "31st day "in
both subsections, and substituted "one year"
for "120 days"in Subsection (7)(b); and in Subsection t8Xa) substituted "41-2-112(15)" for
"41-2-112(14)."
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ADDENDUM B
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Jlerschel f a l l e n (0432)
McDON LI) \ : 'JLLEN

ntton.e ' far Petitioner
•'.•'ho Her les Building
455 L'ast Fifth South, Suite* 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telophone: (801) 359-0999
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
>TATE OF UTAH
* oooQooo-—
JUDY A. CORDOVA,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,
vs.
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, Bureau
Chief, Records Eureau, Drivers
License Division,

Civil No. 920901040
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Respondent.
oooOooo
The above captioned matter came on before the Honorable J.
Dennis Frederick on the 30th day of April, 1992, at the hour of
9:00 a.m., Herschel Bullen appearing for the Petitioner and Thorn
Roberts, Assistant Attorney General, appearing for the Respondent.
The Petitioner having made a Motion to Vacate and Set Aside the
administrative

Order

suspending

the. driving

privilege of

the

Petitioner, based upon the exhibits received, the pleadings and
record of the case and having heard argument of counsel, the Court
now makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

An administrative hearing regarding the Department of

Public Safety Driver's License Division's intention to suspend the
Petitioner's driving privileges as a result of Petitioner's arrest

for driving under the influence of clcohol or L.ay drug on January
24, 1992 f

was scheduled yuxcuexvt

to

Vivtitionor1 r; request on or

about February 19, 1992,, at the hour of 9 s00 C^KU, at 27C0 Uest
4700 South, West Valley City, Utah.
2*

The record of the administrative suspension hearing

reflect! that "no one appeared for the hearing", and no witnesses
te Jtified whatsoever, not the arresting officer, the operator of
the breathilyzer, the Petitioner, nor anyone else,' The evidence
apparently considered at the hearing ?as the arresting officer*s
D.U.I. Report form, a copy of the operational check list, a
breathilyzer

test

result, and the Utah Department

of Public

Safety's "record of intoxilyzer test and affidavit" for the day
January 22, 1992.
3.

The

Department

of

Public

Safety

issued

its

Order

suspending the Petitioner's driving privilege.
4.

The Order of the Department of Public Safety, effective

12:01, a.m., on February 23, 1992, states that,
"the basis for such action is findings of fact
and conclusion by the hearing officer for the
Department that a peace officer had reasonable
grounds that you were operating, or were in
physical control of a motor vehicle while
under the influence in violation of, or failed
to request a hearing, contrary toU.C.A. 41-644 and U.C-A. 41-2-130."
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes
and enters the following

2

CONCLUSIONS OF LA\1
!•

T'Jith respect to Respondent*::; argument that Petitioner's

failure to appear at the rdraini^trative hearing constitutes a
\v&:Lvor oi her :ri;;tt to object to the basic of the Respondent's
Order of B\^'oons±onr

the Court concludes that that argument is not

compelling * though it may have be<^n had the arrest "ing officer or
other witnesses for t *e State appeared and testified.
2.

The

ll

residuum rule" set forth in Kehl v. Schwendiman. 735

P.2d 413 (Ct. of App. 1987) is applicable to this fact situation
and

requires

that

some degree or modicum

of competent

legal

evidence support the Respondent agencyf s findings.
3.

In as much as there was not a residuum of competent legal

evidence to support the agency's finding, this Court concludes that
-the determination of the Department of Public Safety Driver's
License Division to suspend the driving privilege of the Plaintiff
was arbitrary and capricious,
4.

The requirement of a hearing and findings supported by a

modicum of competent legal evidence is an appropriate and necessary
safeguard to protect Petitioner and persons similarly situated from
having their driving privilege ;aken from them without due process
of lav/.
5. This court is not compelled to hold a trial de novo in all
cases, otherwise the administrative process would be valueless and
not subject to judicial review.
3

G.

The objection raised by the Petitioner is not ! ;;rely

technical, non-prejudicial . .id procedural, arid trial ds novo would
iiot be the proper remedy to cure such prejudicial error.
Dated this

day of May, 1992.

J. DENNIS FREDERICK
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGi£
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

THOM D. ROBERTS
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ADDENDUM C
UTAH CODE ANN. SEC. 44-6-44.10 (Supp. 1992)

41-6-44.8

MOTOR VEHICLES

41-6-44.8. Municipal attorneys for .*-pacified offenses m a y
prosecute for certain DUI offenses and driving
while license suspended or revoked.
The following class A misdemeanors may be prosecuted by attorneys of
cities and towns, as well as by prosecutors authorized elsewhere in this code to
prosecute these alleged violations:
(1> alleged class A misdemeanor violations of Subsection 41-6-44(6)(a)(ii); and
(2) alleged violations of Section 41-2-136, which consist of the person
operating a vehicle while his operator's license is suspended or revoked
for a violation of Section 41-6-44, a local ordinance which complies with
the requirements of Section 41-6-43, Section 41-6-44.10, Section 76-5-207,
or a criminal prohibition that the person was charged with violating as a
result of a plea bargain after having been originally charged with violating one or more of those sections or ordinances.
History: C. .1953, 41-8-44.8, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 102, § 1; 1987, ch. 138, § 40; 1990,
ch. 299, § 2; 1991, ch. 147, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1990, added the introductory paragraph and Subsection (1); designated the former section as Subsection (2); and

made a related stylistic change in present Subsection (2).
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29,
1991, deleted "or a local ordinance similar to
Subsection 41-6-44(6)(a)(ii) that complies with
therequirementsof Section 41-6-43" at the end
of Subsection (1).

41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or
d r u g — N u m b e r of tests — Refusal — Warning,
r e p o r t — Hearing, revocation of license — Appeal — P e r s o n incapable of refusal — Results of
test available — Who may give test — Evidence.
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to
have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or
urine for the purpose of determining whether he was operating or in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath
alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44 or 41-8-44.4,
ox while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, if the test is or tests are administered at the direction of a peace officer having grounds to believe that
person to have been operating or in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44 c 41-6-4- 4, or while under the influence of
alcohol, any drug, or corr unation of alcohol and any drug under Section
41-6-44.
(b) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered
and how many of them are administered, except the officer shall request
that either the blood or urine test be administered under Section
76-5-207. If an officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to
take one or more requested tests, oven though ho does submit to any other
requested test or tests, is a refusal under this section.
AuA
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(c) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to a
chemic 1 test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, may not select the test
or tests to be administered. The failure or inability of a peace officer to
arrange for any specific chemical test is not a defense to taking a test
requested by a peace officer, and it is not a defense in any criminal, civil,
or administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit
to the requested test or tests.
(2) (a) If th 3 person has been placed under arrest, has then been requested
by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical tests under
Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to any chemical test requested, the
person shall be warned by the peace officer requesting the test or tests
that a refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of the
person's license to operate a motor vehicle. Following this warning, unless the person immediately requests that the chemical test or tests as
offered by a peace officer be administered, no test may be given.
(b) A peace officer shall serve on the person, on behalf of the division,
immediate notice of the division's intention to revoke the person's privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle. When the officer serves the
immediate notice on behalf of the division, he shall:
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator;
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 30 days; and
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the division,
basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the division.
1
(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if approved as to form by
the division, serve also as the temporary license.
(d) The peace officer shall submit a signed report, within five days after
the date of the arrest, that he had grounds to believe the arrested person
had been operating or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4 or while under the influence of alcohol or
any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44
and that the person had refused to submit to a chemical test or tests
under Subsection (1).
(e) A person who has been notified of the division's intention to revoke
his license under this section is entitled to a hearing. A request for the
hearing shall be made in writing within ten days after the date of the
arrest. Within 20 days after receiving a written request, the division shall
notify the person of his opportunity to be heard as early as practicable. If
the person does not make a timely written request for a hearing before
the division, his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Utah shall be
revoked for a period of one year beginning on the 31st day after the date
of arrest.
(f) If a hearing is requested by the person and conducted by the division, and the division determines that the person was requested to submit
to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or tests, or if
the person fails to appear before the division as required in the notice, the
division shall revoke his license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in
Utah for one year, beginning on the date the hearing is held. The division
shall also assess against the person, in addition to any fee imposed under
283
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Subsection 41-2-112(15), a fee under Section 41-2-103, which shall be paid
before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative
costs, The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappeaied court
decision following a proceeding allowed under this subsection that the
revocation was improper,
(g) (i) Any person whose license has beer, revoked by the division under this section may seek judicial review.
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a
trial. Venue is in the district court in the county in which the person
resides.
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other ondition rendering him inca] able of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is considered to not ha^e withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the
test or tests may be administered wiiether the perso- has been arrested or not.
(4) Upon the request of the person who was testeu, the results of the test or
tests shall be made available to him.
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under Section 26-1-30, acting at the request of a • eace officer, may
withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or drug content. This limitation does not apply to the taking of a urine or breath specimen.
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under Section 26-1-30 who, at the direction of a peace officer, draws
a sample of blood from any person whom a peace officer has reason to
believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical facility at which the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or criminal
liability arising from drawing the sample, if the test is administered
according to standard medical practice.
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician of
his own choice administer a chemical test in addition to the te, '<: or tests
administered at the direction of a peace officer.
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect
admissibility of the results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a
peace officer, or preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the
direction of a peace officer.
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests administered at the direction of a peace officer.
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to c ubmit to a chemic 1 test or
tests, the person to be tested does not have the rij it to consult an attorney or
have an attorney, ; hysician, or other person present as a condition for the
talking of any test.
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemic I test or tests or
any additional test under this section, evidence of any refusal is adm ;sible in
any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts allegec to havrj
been committed while the person was operating or in ctual physical contr I
of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug.
Hisi ry: C. 1953, 41-6-44.10, enacted by L.
1981, , h. 123, § 43; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 16;
1987, ch. 120, § 3; 1987, ch. 133, § 41; 1987,
ch. 151, § 143; 1937 (1st S.S.), ch. 3, §§ 3, 4;

1988, cb. 148, § 1; 1990, ch. 30, § 2J; 1902,
oh. 73, § 3.
Amendment Notes. —- The 1990 amendment, effective April 23, 1S90, substituted
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^'specific chemical test" for "specific test'* in the
secoj^i .sentence in Subsection (I)(.c); deleted
"or any o.v;e or all of the tests" after "chemical
test" ivi the first sentence in Subsection (2)(a);
d^n&nated the former third and fourth sentence?; in Subjection (2)(a) as )J esent Subsection (2Kb); designated the fir : two sentences
in former Subsection (2)(a)(iii as present Subsections (2)(c) and (d) and redesignated former
Subsections (2)(b) to (2)(d) as present Subsections (2)(e) to (2)(g); and made stylistic
changes.

41-6-44.10

The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,
1992, inserted '"'under Section 41-6-44 or
41-6-44.4" in two places in Subsection (l)(o.)
and in Subsection (2KdV, substituted "Subsection 41-2-112(15)" for "Subsection 41-2-112(14)" in the second sentence in Subsection
(2)(f); ad sub ituted "Section 26-1-30" for
"Subsecion 2( oOQ9)" in Subsections (5)(a)
and (5)(bh

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Administration of test.
Grounds for requesting test.
Independent test.
Prerequisites for admission into evidence.
Proceeding to revoke iicense for failure i J submit to test.
—Appeal moot.
Refusal to submit to test.
Right to refuse test.
Cited.
Administration of test.
Defendant had no statutory or constitutional
right to have the police provide her with a bottle in order to collect a urine sample, and the
fact that a police officer attempted to facilitate
her request as a courtesy did not render the
police responsible for the manner in which she
collected the sample or her failure to effectively pursue an analysis of that sample. Provo
City'Corp. v. Werner, 810 P.2d 469 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991).
Grounds for requesting t e s t
This section does not require an arrest prior
to taking a blood sample, and allows drawing
blood from an unconscious person with or without an arrest. State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).

who had not been placed under arrest before
his blood was drawn. State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d
122 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Proceeding to revoke license for failure to
submit to test.
—Appeal moot.
Where the only issue on appeal was the status of the defendant's license revocations,
which were no longer in effect, and no cognizable collateral consequences were legally imposed on the defendant because of the now-expired revocations, the expiration of the defendant's revocation periods mooted the appeals.
Phillips v. Schwendiman, 802 P.2d 108 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).
Refusal to submit to test.
Driver's conduct was refusal when, although
he verbally agreed to tests, he obstructed the
process by sticking his tongue over and chewing on the mouthpiece and blowing out the
sides of his mouth, thereby preventing officers
from obtaining an adequate, viable breath
sample. Cowan v. Schwendiman, 769 P.2d 2S0
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Independent test.
The right afforded by the implied consent
law is the right to seek to obtain an independent test, not an absolute right to obtain a test.
Pr< vo City Corp. v. Werner, 810 P.2d 469
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Right to refuse test.
Blood sample taken from a juvenile motorist
who was not placed under arrest, who was not
informed that he could refuse to submit to the
test, and who did not consent thereto, was
taken contrary to the provisions of this section,
and the test results were therefore inadmissible. In re I.. 771 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1989), vacating 739 P.2d 1124 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (noted
in bound volume under this catchline).

Prerequisi es for admission into evidence.
This section was inapplicable to a defendant

Cited in Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d
42 (Utah 1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal
Law, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 177.

A.L.R. — Sufficiency of showing of physical
inability to take tests for driving while intoxicated to justify refusal, 68 A.L.R.4th 776.
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ADDENDUM D
UTAH CODE ANN. SEC. 63-46B-17 (1989)

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT

63-46b-17

(i) ihe persons taking the agency action were ^.legally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqi .lification;
(Q • tho agency action is based upon a determination of ft .t, made or
imp *,d by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record be re t) 3 court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rale of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
History: C. 1953, 63-48b-18, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, eh, 72, § 26.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, substituted "As
provided by statute; the Supreme Coi: t or the
Court of Appeals" for "The Supr me Court or
)ther appellate court designatea by statute" in
subsection (1); inserted "with the appropriate

appellate court" in Subsection (2)fa); and substituted "appellate rules of the appropriate appellat-court" for "Utah Rules of Appellate Proin Subsections (2)(a) and (2Kb).
cedur<
Effective Dat <•;. Laws 1987, ch. 161,
§ ; n 5 m a k e s the act effective on Januarv l]
3.933

NOTES TO DECISIONS
'unction of district court,
Subsection (1) provides that all final agency
visions through formal adjudicative proceedtgs ••/ill.be reviewed by the Utah Supreme
Durt or Court of Appeals. Therefore, the dis-

trict court will no longer function as intermediate appellate coi t except to review informal
adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to
§ 63-46b-15(l)(a). In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).

3~48b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief.
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the
district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the
extent expressly authorized by statute,
(b) In granting relief, the court may:
(i) order agency action re mired by law;
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law;
(iii) set aside or modify agency action;
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings.
2) Decisions on petitions for judicia review of final agency action are rewable by a higher court, if authorized by statute.
istory: C. 1953, 63-46b«17, enacted by L.
'f ch. 161, § 273.
fective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,

§ 315 makes the act effective on January 1,
1988.
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ADDENDUM E
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-46b-15 (Supp. 1992)

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT

63-46b-3.0

(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
(A) (a) A -arty shall fas a petition for judicial review oflinal agency action.
within SO dayr, alter t<a; date tb r -t the order constituting the final agency
action is issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection
63-46b-13(3)(b).
(b) Tile petition shall name the zg2ncy and all other appropriate parties as respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this
chapter.
History: C. 3A53, G3-40I>14, enacted by L,
1937, ch! 161, § 270; Ifc&J, eh. 72, § 24.
Amendment Notes. — The 1&88 amendrnent, effective April 25, 1988, divided former
Subsection (1) into present Subsections (1) and
(2) and redesignated former Subsection (2) as
present Subsection (3); added t!or is considered

to have been issued under Subsection
63-46b-13(3)<bi" in Subsection (3); and made
minor stylistic changes,
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,
§ 3 1 5 r n a k e s the act effective on Januarv 1,
1QS8.

S3-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo
all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings.
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall
be as provided in the statute governing the agency or, in the absence of
such a venue provision, in the county where the petitioner resides or
maintains his principal place of business.
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings
.. shall be a complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
shall include:
(i) the name and mailing address of the party seeking judicial review;
(ii) the name and mailing address of the respondent agency;
(iii) the title and date of the final agency action to be reviewed,
together w ch a duplicate copy, summary, or brief description of the
agency action;
(iv) identification of the persons who were parties in the informal
adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action;
(v) a copy of the written agency order from the informal proceeding;
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review is
entitled to obtain judicial review;
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the type and extent of relief
requested;
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to
relief,
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of
fact and law and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings.
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(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings v ider
section.
History: C. 1953, 63«46b-15, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, deleted "except
that final agency action from informal adjudicative proceedings based on a record shall be
reviewed by the district courts on the record

according to the standards of
S3-46b-16(4)" at the end in SubsecUoMlK^
and made minor stylistic changes.
' #1!
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987 ch Ifiv^
§ 315 m a k e s the act effective on Januarv1
1988.
^

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Function of district court.
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final
agency decisions through formal adjudicative
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore,

the district court will no longer function as &.
termediate appellate court except to review I Q ^
formal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursu ^
ant to Subsection QXa) of this section. In rel
Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)- ^

63-48h~16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeais nas
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
: ^
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal'
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Files of
Appellate Procedure, except tl at:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize • le record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
short: a, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The app late court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has b en substantially prejudiced by any of the foliowir -;:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional ou its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted hovond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all ot' the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(0) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
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